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Abstract
Thomas Pogge has recently argued that the way in which research and development of essential
medicines is incentivized, under existing World Trade Organization rules, should be supplemented
with an additional incentivizing mechanism. One might hold a stronger view than the one that
Pogge currently holds, namely that patent rights for essential medicines are morally unjustified
per se. Throughout this paper, ‘the strong view’ refers to this view. The strong view is one that
enjoys considerable support both within and outside the academic community. This paper critically
discusses one specific argument in favor of the strong view. This argument is named the ‘Poggean
argument’. This denominator is appropriate because a number of the essential premises of
the argument are constituted by propositions that Pogge at some point has defended. The Poggean
argument is valid, and defenders of the strong view also have some grounds for believing that the
argument is sound. This belief comes, however, with what is arguably a too high cost, namely that
the global institutional order becomes very demanding on taxpaying citizens of high-income
countries if it is to be just. One may find acceptance of this cost relatively unproblematic, but
this cost is, it is argued, unacceptable to anyone who has views on distributive justice that are
sympathetic to the core tenets of libertarianism.
Keywords: political philosophy; global justice; essential medicines; patent rights; Thomas
Pogge; libertarianism
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
negotiated in the 1986 Uruguay Round under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) incorporated considerable protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) into the international trade system.
1 A very
substantive body of contemporary interdisciplinary literature suggests that IPRs,
as implemented in the TRIPS agreement, and various other trade agreements, give
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119rise to a number of moral problems.
2 The moral problems raised by IPRs are
especially vivid when it is socially valuable goods such as essential medicines that are
given intellectual property protection.
3 From a distinctively philosophical perspec-
tive, there can be no doubt that Thomas Pogge is the most important contributor
to the debate on the moral aspects of the TRIPS agreement. Pogge has, in a number
of important writings, argued that the way in which research and development
(R&D) of essential medicines is incentivized under the TRIPS agreement should be
supplemented with an additional incentivizing mechanism.
4 Together with Aidan
Hollis, Pogge has suggested the Health Impact Fund (HIF).
5
At the heart of the HIF is the idea that a company that receives marketing approval
for a new medicine will be offered a choice between exercising its usual patent rights
through high prices or registering its product with the HIF. Registration with the
HIF comes with a requirement that the company must sell its product worldwide at a
price near the average cost of production and distribution. In return for selling its
product at a low price, the company will receive, from the HIF, a stream of payments
based on the assessed global health impact of its medicine. As a result, the HIF is an
optional pay-for-performance scheme for new pharmaceutical products. The HIF is,
moreover, a proposal that promises to reduce the scope of the availability problem
in virtue of offering big monetary rewards to companies that develop medicines
for diseases that primarily affect populations in low-income countries.
6 The HIF is
envisaged to be financed principally by contributions made by national governments.
A key feature of the HIF is that when a company registers its product with the
HIF, the traditional link between a high selling price of a product and a substantive
profit for the company producing the product is severed. This is so because profits
from a product are no longer generated primarily through a high sales price for the
product. A company that produces an effective medicine against, say, tuberculosis,
registers the medicine with the HIF, and sells the medicine at a low price is likely to
make a relatively huge profit on the medicine given that it will significantly reduce the
global disease burden.
Through his involvement in the articulation and defense of the HIF idea, Pogge
is not in recent writings, it is very important to note, opposed to patent rights for
essential, or non-essential, medicines per se but only opposed to an unsupplemented
patent right scheme for medicines.
One might hold a stronger view than the one that Pogge currently holds, namely
that patent rights for essential medicines are morally unjustified per se.
7 Throughout
this paper, ‘the strong view’ refers to this view. It is important to be aware that the
strong view is one that enjoys considerable support both within and outside the
academic community. Consider, for example, the following five passages:
1. When a patent monopoly is against public interest*as is the case in many poor
countries most affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic*governments have the
right and the obligation to free themselves from that monopoly.
8
2. If patents in poor countries do not serve valid public health purposes
or contribute to pharmaceutical innovation, they cannot be seen as justifiable
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imposition should in fact be seen as serious violations of human rights. The
strong evidence and growing consensus that pharmaceutical patents in poor
countries serve no public interest or innovative function suggest fundamental
flaws in the justifications for the current global patent system, particularly
considering the disproportionate regional loss of life that results from the
stringent enforcement of patents for essential medicines.
9
3. Patents are by no means the only barrier to accessing lifesaving medicines,
but they do play a significant role. Challenging invalid patents is therefore of
crucial importance in order to prevent unwarranted patent monopolies and
make treatment available to the people who need it.
10
4. We might think that if there is a moral right to access essential medicines, then
the fact that someone would be no worse off than if the company had not
invented the drug is not enough to show that he/she is not wronged. While it
seems plausible to say that intellectual property restrictions can violate rights,
it is much less plausible to think that any and every restriction will do so: if the
good which is protected by IPRs does not serve a serious need (like a new type of
coffee grinder), or if an existing item in the intellectual commons could perform
substantially the same task, then the case for rights violation is weak. It is only
where the good from which the person will be excluded is of substantial impor-
tance, and where the good cannot be substituted for one from the commons that
it seems plausible to think that IP (Intellectual Property) regulation will violate
rights.
11
5. Drug patents, particularly the strong kind of drug patents granted today, are hard
tojustifyonnaturalrights, fairness,or utilitariangrounds.Manydrugsare ofvital
importance for very large groups of people. This vital importance should be
reflected in the debate about the justification of drug patents. The proposition
that in the absence of strong patents no R&D of drugs can be expected is typically
presented as universally valid*whereas it may well be that the advisable level of
patent protection (or even the decision whether or not to grant protection) has to
be determined inrelation tothe levelof economic development of a country [...].
It seems that the reason why pharmaceutical lobbies are such zealous advocates
of strong patents in developing countries is that it would allow them to hinder
competition from local drug manufacturers. There is no credible evidence that
the new global patent regime will promote the development of new medicines for
diseases occurring primarily or exclusively in developing countries. Instead, this
regime severely limits these countries’ possibilities to implement a public health
policy that addresses the health crises they are confronted with, and it is one of
the main factors that hinders access to existing (patented) drugs*access which
the lives of millions of people depend on.
12
The overall topic of this paper is that of patent rights for essential medicines.
In particular, the paper discusses one specific argument in favor of the strong view.
I believe that the strong view is false, but in the next section, I do some work on
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be used to underpin the strong view. I call this argument the ‘Poggean argument’.
I use this denominator because a number of the essential premises of the argument
are constituted by propositions that Pogge at some point has defended. I leave to one
side the mainly exegetical issue of whether Pogge currently accepts the relevant
premises.
The Poggean argument is valid, and I concede that defenders of the strong view
also have some grounds for believing that the argument is sound. This belief comes,
however, with what I take to be a too high cost, namely that the global institutional
order becomes very demanding on taxpaying citizens of high-income countries if it is
to be just. One may find acceptance of this cost relatively unproblematic, but this
cost is, I argue, unacceptable to anyone who has views on distributive justice that are
broadly sympathetic to core tenets of that libertarian position in political philosophy
that has its modern genesis in Nozick.
13 It is indeed one of the main conclusions
of the paper that anyone who is of a broadly libertarian persuasion in political
philosophy must be committed to the view that the Poggean argument is not sound.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: in the next section,
the Poggean argument is introduced. The section after that contains a critique of the
Poggean argument. This critique centers on premise (1) of the argument. The main
lesson to take away from this section is that if one accepts premise (1), then one is
committed to a very demanding view of what a just national, as opposed to global,
institutional order requires of taxpaying citizens in any high-income country. In the
fourth section, I consider three replies that a defender of the Poggean argument can
give in response to the offered critique of the Poggean argument.
The first reply is based on reference to a rather classical principle for how to set an
upper limit for the duty to be beneficent. The principle in question is Liam Murphy’s
‘cooperative principle’. I argue that this first reply is unconvincing. The second
reply trades on a detail in the wording of the passage from which (1) is derived. The
exact wording of this passage may offer an escape route from the offered critique.
It is argued that, in the end, this second reply is also unconvincing. The third reply
is a suggestion to the effect that the critique of the Poggean argument rests on a
misunderstanding of (1).
In the fifth section, I address this third reply in detail. I argue that the initial worry
about premise (1) leading to an excessive demand in terms of how much money
high-income countries should spend on Official Development Assistance (ODA) is
just as relevant when the focus of the discussion is the social and economic rules
imposed by the global institutional order as opposed to the social and economic rules
that any individual high-income country imposes on its own citizens. Put very briefly,
the central contention of this section is that if premise (1) is true, then a just global
institutional order becomes very demanding on taxpaying citizens of high-income
countries. I argue that one can bite the bullet and accept this implication of (1), but
this is not an avenue that is open for travel for Pogge or anyone with libertarian
leaning views. Furthermore, I offer some considerations as to why non-libertarians
might want to be hesitant about believing that premise (1) is a principle that has
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conditions for a just global institutional order.
The concluding section of the paper is constituted by some final considerations.
I make clear what can be reasonably concluded about the plausibility of the strong
view if my critique of the Poggean argument is correct, and I present a dilemma that
faces anyone who wishes to argue in favor of the strong view with the use of ideas
expressed in the passages from which premises (1), (2), and (4) of the Poggean
argument are derived. I suggest that on both horns of the dilemma, anyone who
wishes to argue in this manner is likely to run into problems. Furthermore, I express
skepticism about the plausibility of establishing a convincing argument in favor of the
strong view from assumptions that a consequentialist in moral theory can accept.
THE POGGEAN ARGUMENT
With the domain of discourse being sets of social and economic rules, the Poggean
argument can semiformally be presented like this:
1 (1) For every x, if x is avoidably depriving large numbers of persons of secure access
to the objects of their human rights, then x is unjust.
14 Assumption
2 (2) The set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights for
essential medicines is depriving large number of victims of diseases that destroy a
human life of secure access to relevant essential medicines.
15 Assumption
1 (3) If the set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights for
essential medicines is avoidably depriving large numbers of persons of secure access
to the objects of their human rights, then this set of rules is unjust. 1, Universal
quantifier elimination
4 (4) If the set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights
for essential medicines is depriving large number of victims of diseases that destroy a
human life of secure access to relevant essential medicines, then this set of rules is
avoidably depriving large numbers of persons of secure access to the objects of their
human rights.
16 Assumption
2,4 (5) The set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights
for essential medicines is avoidably depriving large numbers of persons of secure
access to the objects of their human rights.
17 2,4 Conditional elimination
1,2,4 (6) The set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights
for essential medicines is unjust. 3,5 Conditional elimination
7 (7) If the set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent rights
for essential medicines is unjust, then this set of rules is morally unjustified.
Assumption
1,2,4,7 (8) The set of social and economic rules that currently underwrite patent
rights for essential medicines is morally unjustified. 6,7 Conditional elimination
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Consider a country such as Sweden that in addition to providing free healthcare and
education to any of its citizens also spends a relatively large part of its gross national
income (GNI) on various uni- and bilateral ODA programs.
18 This way of priori-
tizing the use of economic means is expressed through a number of economic/legal
rules that are embedded in the various social institutions of Sweden. Premise (1) has
the result that these economic/legal rules come out as being unjust. This is due to the
fact that by modifying these rules, the deprivation of large numbers of persons’
secure access to the objects of their human rights can foreseeably be avoided.
If Sweden, for example, doubled the amount of money it currently spends on ODA,
then a significant amount of additional money would be available for projects that
promote secure access to objects of human rights.
As soon as we raise the possibility of Sweden doubling the amount of money it
currently spends on ODA, and come to realize that this will likely lead to an im-
provement in terms of secure access to objects of human rights, we might entertain
the possibility of further increasing the amount of money to be spent on ODA.
Perhaps Sweden should triple or quadruple the amount of money it spends on ODA.
By making such a change, Sweden will, after all, make even more money available
for ODA and improvements in terms of enabling secure access to objects of human
rights. But, when we start entertaining these possibilities, we might come to think
that there is an upper level with respect to the amount of economic resources that
Sweden, and any other high-income country, can justifiably be asked to set aside for
ODA and human rights improvements.
The worry one might have with premise (1) is that it sets this upper level too
high. What premise (1) mandates is that Sweden (and a host of other high-income
countries) keeps giving away to ODA and human rights improvements up until a
level where the amount of money it can keep, after having provided secure access to
all objects of human rights for all of its own citizens, is extremely small.
Consider the counterfactual situation in which Sweden has adopted an economic/
legal system that stipulates that 20% of its GNI should be allocated to ODA. In order
to achieve this goal, a massive restructuring of the taxation system and the distri-
bution of wealth within Sweden has to be implemented. Assume that with these
changes in place, there are still resources within the system to provide all Swedes with
a secure access to all objects of human rights, and that there is a small surplus on the
national budget. What should this small surplus be spent on? According to premise
(1) of the Poggean argument, justice demands that the surplus should be spent on
ODA provided that the surplus, at least partly, prevents the deprivation of secure
access to objects of human rights for a large number of persons.
Now, given the assumption that even a very small amount of money spent on ODA
cannot fail to prevent, in part, the deprivation of secure access to objects of human
rights for a large number of persons, we arrive at the morally very demanding thesis
that the economic/legal rules of Sweden, in this counterfactual scenario, are unjust
unless the surplus is spent on ODA.
19 Assume, for example, that the surplus in
J. Sonderholm
124question is US$ 6,000. This means that the surplus enables the buying of 400 full
doses of tuberculosis medicine.
20 Distributing one such treatment to each of the
400 patients in, say, Haiti is something that foreseeably and in part prevents
the deprivation of these patients’ human right to medical care. Of course, for the
deprivation of this human right to be wholly avoided for these patients, scores of
other things have to change and scores of other resources have to be allocated to the
goal.
21 However, this does not change the very demanding conclusion that justice,
as construed in premise (1) of the Poggean argument, prescribes that the surplus is
spent on buying doses of tuberculosis treatment and cannot be spent on welfare
improvements within Sweden such as, say, the upgrade of a public swimming pool or
the acquisition of artworks for a public building.
THREE REPLIES TO THE CRITIQUE
A first reply that a proponent of the Poggean argument can make consists in saying
that human rights might correspond to a division of moral responsibility for obliga-
tions to meet those rights. If all high-income countries have obligations to the
members of poor countries, then no one high-income country has to cover the costs
left unpaid by negligent countries. The upper limit of how much ODA a country
such as Sweden is required by justice to provide might be determined by factoring
in how much other high-income countries are required by justice to provide, so that
no single country is left to pay the whole bill. An upper limit to what the Swedes are
obligated to provide is consistent even with absolutist notions of human rights. This
reply is undergirded by a line of thought famously introduced by Liam Murphy.
22
Murphy addresses what might be labeled the ‘over-demandingness objection’, and
he presents and defends a principle about what the legitimate limit is to the duty to
be beneficent. Murphy calls this principle the ‘Cooperative Principle’. In its entirety,
it goes like this:
Each agent is required to act optimally*to perform the action that makes the
outcome best*except in situations of partial compliance with this principle. In
situations of partial compliance it is permissible to act optimally, but the sacrifice
each agent is required to make is limited to the level of sacrifice that would be
optimal if the situation were one of full compliance; of the actions that require no
more than this level of sacrifice, agents are required to perform the action that
makes the outcome best.
23
By invoking the Cooperative Principle, or some close version thereof, a defender of
the Poggean argument can say that a commitment to premise (1) does not saddle
individual countries with an overly extensive obligation to eradicate human rights
deficits. The duty of individual countries is relatively limited because each country is
only required to do what would be optimal in an ideal situation of full compliance in
which all high-income countries did what was optimal to secure the eradication of
human rights deficits.
The Cooperative Principle is, however, not plausible. Murphy himself explicitly
acknowledges this by presenting a counterexample to it.
24 Consider two adults walking
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drowning in a lake, and the location of the children is such that if each of the two
adults wades into the lake, they can both save one child and they can each catch their
respective flight. If either of the adults saves both children, then that person will miss
his/her flight. Murphy acknowledges that the best thing would be for each of the two
adults to save one child. Suppose, however, that one of the adults refuses to sustain
any loss to help a child. In this scenario, the whole burden of saving both children
will fall on the other adult, and she has, as Murphy says, to put up with it and pick up
the slack from the other person’s unwillingness to help out.
In the following text, I suggest a version of this example that involves individual
countries and not distinct individuals. The lessen to learn from this example is,
I hope to be able to show, that an individual country like, say, Sweden is morally unjus-
tified in refusing to pick up the slack from other high-income countries’ unwilling-
ness to help out with respect to the eradication of human rights deficits. If this
example really is a counterexample to the plausibility of the Cooperative Principle
as applied to the division of moral obligations among individual countries as opposed
to distinct individuals, my contention is that enough has been done to establish a very
significant weakness in the first reply to the critique of the Poggean argument.
Consider two national development agencies that each is running a tubercu-
losis clinic on, say, Haiti. Let us assume that the one clinic is run by the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and that the other one is
run by The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).
25 Both clinics are
running close to capacity, both with respect to budget constraints and the rules that
specify working hours and leave for the employees working at the respective clinics.
Imagine nowthat there is asudden and unexpected surge in the demand for treatment
at anyone of the two clinics. We may assume that 400 additional tuberculosis patients
are lining up for treatment at a central gathering place from where patients are
normally distributed to one of the two clinics.
The situation is now as follows: if both clinics treat 200 patients each, each clinic
(and by extension, each country) will bear only one cost, namely that of a budget
transgression that stems from the cost of buying an additional 200 doses of tuber-
culosis medicine. If each clinic takes 200 patients each, each clinic will not be forced
to make reductions in the amount of leave time that the health-care personnel, at the
respective clinics, are entitled to according to their contracts with the respective
governments. If one clinic will have to treat all 400 patients, then this clinic will bear
two costs: a more severe budget transgression and a reduction in the amount of
leave time that employees at the clinic are entitled to (such a reduction may cause
frustration among the employees and may make it difficult for the government to
recruit qualified personnel in the future for other relatively similar projects).
Under these circumstances, it would surely be optimal if each clinic took 200
patients each. Now, however, it turns out that KOICA refuses to take any additional
patients. SIDA takes the first 200 patients from the line and then formulates a
generic message directed to patient number 201 and all the rest of the patients in the
line. The content of this message is that SIDA will not treat any remaining patients
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is a good principle to apply when to determine who has obligations to do what to
eradicate human rights deficits. According to this principle, Sweden (and any other
country) is only under a moral obligation to do what would be optimal in an ideal
situation of full compliance, and Sweden is therefore only under a moral obligation
to treat 200 patients. Sweden is, the message emphasizes, not under any moral obliga-
tion to pick up the slack from other countries’ (in this case Korea’s) unwillingness to
help out and do their fair share.
At this point, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that what the intuitive power of the
original counterexample to the Cooperative Principle rests on is that the additional
cost that the rescuer must incur when he/she picks up the slack from the unco-
operative bystander, and saves the second child, is that he/she misses his/her flight.
The example trades on the idea that this is a relatively small cost to pay to achieve
the valuable end of saving a child’s life. The new example is relevantly similar. The
only additional cost that the Swedish government incurs from picking up the slack
from the Korean government’s unwillingness to help out is that it must impose
a worsening of the working conditions of some of its employees at the clinic.
26 The
intuition upon which the new example rests is that this is a relatively small cost to
pay for the valuable end of offering treatment to 200 tuberculosis patients many
of whom will foreseeably die if they do not receive treatment.
27 One can object to
the suggestion that the above example shows what it is supposed to show either
by arguing for the claim that the original counterexample is not convincing or by
arguing that the new example is not relevantly similar to the original one. If one takes
the former line, then one faces an uphill battle that consists in explaining away all
the counterintuitive implications that the Cooperative Principle entails.
28 I have no
conclusive argument to block attempts to take the latter line. The burden of proof with
respect to the plausibility of any such attempt must, however, lie with its advocates.
A second possible reply to the critique of the Poggean argument consists in making
the suggestion that even though the deprivation of secure access to objects of human
rights can in part be avoided by Sweden spending 20% of its GNI, and whatever
budget surplus it may have after this, on ODA, Sweden should not modify its current
social rules to fit such an economic scheme. The reason for this is that such modified
rules are not ‘suitable’. By inserting in the passage from which premise (1) has
derived the clause about ‘suitably modified rules’, a defender of the argument has
certainly reserved himself/herself the right to give such an answer. However, in the
absence of a clarification and defense of a suggestion with respect to what ‘suitable’
means and what general principle could be used to demarcate suitable modifications
of the global institutional order from unsuitable ones, premise (1) has little, if any,
theoretical significance or practical applicability.
It should here be observed that if it is suggested that the general principle in
question is one that prescribes that providing secure access to all objects of human
rights for all persons takes priority over alternative principles for institutional design
(for example, one that says that the morally best course of action, policy or institution
is the one that maximizes future human welfare),
29 then one has done little to counter
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the very demanding conclusion that Sweden should keep giving away to ODA up
until a level where the amount of money it can keep, after having provided secure
access to all objects of human rights to all Swedes, is extremely small.
30
A third reply that a proponent of the Poggean argument can make consists in
suggesting that the critique rests on a misunderstanding of the issue of what features
of social and economic rules should be taken into account when we are to determine
whether or not these rules are just. What really underwrites premise (1) is the idea
that social and economic rules are unjust if they avoidably deprive large numbers of
persons on whom they are imposed of secure access to the objects of their human rights.
This interpretation of (1) squares well with a view that Pogge himself has
developed: namely that the global institutional order is unjust because it avoidably
deprives large number of persons of secure access to objects of their human rights.
31
This deprivation is, for example, caused by the various kinds of trade barriers and
huge subsidies to domestic producers that are built into the global institutional order.
Insofar as Sweden has signed up to this global institutional order, Sweden’s social
rules are, on Pogge’s view, unjust.
If this is a correct interpretation of premise (1), then the offered critique of the
Poggean argument loses its potency. The subset of social rules of Sweden that
dictates how much of its GNI should be spent on bi- and unilateral ODA programs
cannot reasonably be said to be imposed on the citizens of Haiti. This subset of social
rules is only imposed on Swedish citizens, and in the above example, these rules do
not deprive a large number of Swedes of secure access to the objects of their human
rights. Therefore, this subset of rules does not satisfy the sufficient condition for
being unjust that is set forth in premise (1).
MOVING TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
One might think that this is the end of the dialectic, but it is not. The initial worry
about premise (1) leading to an excessive demand in terms of giving away to ODA
can now be raised with respect to the international level as opposed to a national one.
By definition, a global institutional order is imposed on everyone, and if premise (1)
yields the criterion that the rules that underlie the global institutional order must
meet in order to be just, then the bar for justice is set extremely high.
Consider the counterfactual scenario in which the global institutional order
stipulates that high-income countries must give away 10% of their GNI to projects in
low-income countries that aim at improving secure access to objects of human rights.
Assume also that this influx of new resources does not prevent that a large number of
persons in low-income countries do not have secure access to all objects of their
human rights.
In this scenario, premise (1) warrants the judgment that the global institutional
order is unjust. The injustice of the order stems from the fact that the order avoidably
deprives a large number of persons of secure access to objects of their human rights.
If the rules of this order were modified so as to demand that high-income countries
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the old rules did not enjoy secure access to the objects of their human rights, would
start enjoying such access.
32 Premise (1) also entails that a just global institutional
order must insist that high-income countries keep giving away to ODA up until a
point where either everybody enjoys secure access to all objects of their human rights
or the amount of money left for redistribution is so small that it cannot prevent,
in part, the deprivation of large numbers of persons’ secure access to objects of
their human rights. In combination, these things add up to a view about what a just
global institutional order looks like that is very demanding on the taxpaying citizens
of high-income countries.
One reply one can make to this critique consists in just rejecting the intuition upon
which the critique rests. One can, so to speak, bite the bullet and suggest that if the
demands of a just global institutional order are as high as described above, then we
just have to accept it. It is, one can continue, no argument to suggest that such a high
demand on taxpaying citizens of high-income countries is too demanding to be just.
To make such a suggestion is to do nothing more than express an intuition, and it is
of course open to other people to simply reject that intuition.
I accept that this is a logically acceptable reply to my objection. I say a little bit
more below about why the implications of this reply may make one hesitant to
embrace the reply. However, at this point, I want to suggest that the reply is one that
Pogge, or anyone with Pogge leaning views on global justice, cannot consistently
make. In many of his influential writings on global justice, Pogge has professed a
commitment to a broadly libertarian view to the effect that the world’s relatively
well-off primarily have negative duties toward the world’s poor.
33 If Pogge wants to
stay true to this commitment, then it is hard to see how he can accept such high rates
of taxation, on affluent individuals in high-income countries, that are likely to be a
consequence of the Poggean argument. Of course, if such high rates of taxation are
necessary in order to compensate for a harm that the world’s relatively well-off have
inflicted upon the global poor, then Pogge is involved in no inconsistency if he
accepts the very demanding implication of the Poggean argument.
Premise (1) implies, however, that any human rights deficit that could partly be
eradicated through a modification of the rules that underwrite the global institutional
order is one that automatically yields a right to assistance. Such an implication is,
however, much stronger than what a Pogge qua libertarian can accept. A libertarian
figure within contemporary political philosophy can accept that human rights deficit
of x yields an automatic right to assistance from y if and only if human rights deficit
of x has come about through the harmful behavior of y. My master argument against
(1) of the Poggean argument trades on, and draws attention to, scenarios in which
some human rights deficits among the global poor have not wholly come about
through the harmful behavior of any of the world’s relatively well-off individuals.
Whether or not such scenarios exist is, of course, an empirical matter.
34 Premise (1)
is, however, much too strong to be acceptable for anyone with libertarian leaning
views on distributive justice. This is so because the libertarian perspective implies
that a global institutional order can be perfectly just even in scenarios in which 1) a
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human rights (say, they do not have access to minimal healthcare) and 2) a large
number of the global poor could have, in part, their human rights deficits erased
through a modification of the set of rules underlying the global institutional order
(say, an increase in the mandatory taxation rate imposed on the relatively well-off
citizens of high-income countries). Premise (1) automatically implies that any global
institutional order that is in place in a scenario in which scenarios 1) and 2) are
satisfied is unjust.
A second reply one can make to the offered critique of the Poggean argument
consists in saying that though the deprivation of a large number of persons’ secure
access to objects of their human rights can in part be avoided by modifying the
global institutional order along the lines suggested above, no such modification
should be implemented. The reason for this is that such a modification is not
‘suitable’. Again, by inserting in the passage from which premise (1) has derived the
clause about ‘suitably modified rules’, a proponent of the Poggean argument has the
right to give such an answer. However, in the absence of a clarification and defense
of a suggestion with respect to what ‘suitable’ means and what general principle
could be used to demarcate suitable modifications of the global institutional order
from unsuitable ones, it comes across as ad hoc to reject the suggested modifications
on the ground that they are not suitable.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Assume that everything that has been argued in the previous sections is correct.
Where does this leave us? There is certainly no justification for concluding that the
strong view is false. From the fact that one argument in favor of conclusion x is not
sound, it does not follow that all arguments in favor of x lack that property. So, even
if the Poggean argument is not sound, there might be other arguments in favor of the
strong view that are sound.
Defenders of the strong view may take solace from this. Such defenders may also
be inclined to say that the discussion of the Poggean argument is of relatively little
interest because it is so focused on fairly small details of just one argument in favor
of the strong view. It would have been more interesting, the critique would continue,
if the discussion in the previous sections had considered multiple arguments in favor
of the strong view and tried to show that all these different arguments fail.
I think that this critique is largely unfounded. Let me end by offering some
justification for this view by briefly mentioning a broad lesson that one can take away
from the discussion in this paper. The lesson is that it is going to be easy to construct
other valid arguments in favor of the strong view, if one helps oneself to the ideas
expressed in the passages from which premises (1), (2), and (4) are derived. Premises
(1), (2), and (4) are the essential premises of the Poggean argument and from them
one can arrive at the strong view via a multitude of argumentative paths. However,
something of a dilemma presents itself to anyone who goes down any of these paths.
The first horn of the dilemma consists in the fact that the more one leans toward the
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ment is going to be vulnerable to the sorts of ‘demandingness’ objections presented
in this paper. Consider, for example, the fact that both Forman and Wilson, in the
respective passages cited in section one, are happy to accept that there is a right to
essential medicines. In accepting this, they commit themselves to an idea that can
also be found in the passage from which premise (4) is derived.
However, if patients have a right to essential medicines, then the gates are open for
the making of a justified demand that other people must bear the cost of financing
whatever products it is that these patients have a right to, if the patients themselves
cannot shoulder this cost.
35 This is bound to be very demanding on those taxpayers
who will be forced to step in and pay the bill. If one goes as far as Forman and sug-
gests that the right to essential medicines is a core right, then the bar for what must
be the case for this right to be lost is set at a relatively high level, and the financing
obligations of third parties are accordingly arduous.
The second horn of the dilemma is that the more one distances oneself from the
ideas expressed in the passages from which premises (1), (2), and (4) are derived, the
easier it is to stay clear of the criticism developed in this paper. It is then, however,
going to be more difficult to construct a sound argument in favor of the strong view.
Perhaps a sound, consequentialist argument can be assembled in favor of the strong
view. I am skeptical about the feasibility of such an endeavor, but I cannot here
undertake the task of demonstrating the plausibility of such skepticism. The only
thing I can do is to draw attention to a recent argument developed by Rosenberg.
36
This argument demonstrates convincingly, to my mind, that anyone who accepts
fundamental consequentialist assumptions in moral theory must be in favor of patent
rights for essential medicines. Anyone who accepts such assumptions must, that is,
be opposed to the strong view.
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